The 40th Balikatan joint military exercises – the first under the Trump 2.0 government – is underway. This Balikatan is just one part of the new administration’s ‘peace through strength’ strategy, which includes plans to ‘reestablish deterrence’ against China aggression in the Indo-Pacific region. The Philippines’ role in this deterrence was underscored during US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s official visit to the country prior to Balikatan.
Hegseth stated that the Trump administration wants to strengthen the US-PH Ironclad Alliance, assert Philippine sovereignty against China, defend freedom of navigation, and fulfill the US’s peace-seeking initiatives. But these claims mask the US’s ultimate agenda to reaffirm its dominance and counter China’s influence in the region. The Philippines, with its strategic location and resources, are a means to achieve this goal.
This is evident in the worsening US militarism in the country. The Trump administration is continuing what it started during its first term, and correcting what it perceives as the Biden administration’s failure to counter China – by increasing military aid, equipment and troop presence in the Philippines. But for many Filipinos, this means more problems.
Ironclad alliance
To demonstrate its ‘ironclad’ commitment to the Philippines, the Trump administration is reaffirming and building upon existing military agreements between the two countries. While these appear mutually beneficial, these military pacts primarily serve US interests, undermining Philippine sovereignty.
The Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), signed in 1951, obligates both the US and Philippines to provide military support if either is attacked. The US often cites this treaty to justify its increasing intervention in the Philippines, especially in the name of upholding Philippine sovereignty against China aggression. The MDT has been the basis of, and has been enhanced by, several additional agreements.
The 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) allows the docking of US warships and military personnel in the Philippines, providing the legal protections for US forces. The 2002 Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) enables the US to stock war materiel and access Philippine bases. The 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) permits the US to rotate personnel for extended deployments, build and operate facilities, hold trainings, and store and manage military equipment at five designated locations in the Philippines.
Since taking office, Marcos Jr has displayed his subservience to the US by reinforcing these military agreements and agreeing to new ones. He expanded EDCA in 2023 to include four additional sites. Despite claims that these sites are not permanent and will support humanitarian and disaster response efforts, they grant the US unprecedented access to the region, with more EDCA sites than former US military bases.
Subsequent agreements further subordinate the Philippines to the US Security Agenda. The US-Philippines Bilateral Defense Guidelines, signed during Marcos Jr’s May 2023 visit to the US, reaffirms all US-Philippine mutual defense agreements and aims to ‘modernize’ the alliance. The 2024 General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) facilitates intelligence sharing.
Aligned with US strategies in the Indo-Pacific, the Marcos Jr government is pursuing military agreements with other nations. In July 2024, it signed the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with Japan, allowing the latter’s military forces and equipment in the Philippines, and supposedly vice versa although Japan has not yet signed the RAA. Negotiations are also underway for VFAs with France, New Zealand, and Canada.
Enhanced EDCA
The enhancement of the nine EDCA locations was also confirmed during Hegseth’s visit, focusing on expediting facility upgrades to support US military logistics. While both countries assert that the number of designated sites will remain unchanged, reports indicate that the US military is utilizing facilities beyond those specified under EDCA.
The nine EDCA sites are strategically located across the country, with four new sites in the north near Taiwan, accommodating thousands of US personnel and military equipment. These original five sites include: Cesar Basa Air Base in Floridablanca, Pampanga; Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation in Nueva Ecija; Lumbia Airport in Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental; Antonio Bautista Air Base in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan; and Benito Air Base in Cebu. The four new sites are: Naval Base Camilo Osias in Sta. Ana, Cagayan; Lal-lo Airport in Lal-lo, Cagayan; Camp Melchor Dela Cruz in Gamu, Isabela; and Balabac in Palawan.
These EDCA facilities represent the largest number of US defense sites in the South China Sea, a Focal Point in the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM)’s area of responsibility. This is followed only by one military installation in Singapore.
The US allocated US$82 million for the first five EDCA sites from 2014 to 2023, with an additional US$128 million announced for infrastructure projects across seven locations.
However, the Philippine government has permitted the US military to access facilities outside the agreed EDCA sites. Notably, the US military is utilizing facilities and even funding infrastructure upgrades at the now-privatized Subic Bay Freeport Zone, 34 years after their base lease renewal was rejected, forcing them to withdraw from the former naval and air force bases in 1991.
At Subic Bay, the US Naval Sea Systems Command is financing the construction of a new finger pier at the Naval Operating Base Subic, a 100-acre space leased by the Philippine Navy from American private equity fund Cerberus Capital Management since 2022. The Philippine Navy uses the base to dock its patrol vessels and frigates, while US forces also access the facilities for refueling and repairs. Given Subic Bay’s strategic proximity to the Spratly Islands, the new pier is part of US military efforts to ramp up infrastructure support and deepen its defense and military foothold in the Philippines. It will accommodate the Philippine Navy’s newly-acquired vessels as part of its fleet expansion, as well as US Navy warships and frigates.
A March 2025 report also revealed that the US Marine Corps quietly leased a 57,000-square foot warehouse in Subic Bay, initially claimed to be only for supply storage but now staffed with military personnel. The US Navy also plans to lease a 19,000 to 33,000-square meter climate-controlled facility near Subic Bay and Clark for equipment storage by 2026, for a period of 10 years.
Intensive investment
The Trump administration continues the substantial military funding for the Indo-Pacific region initiated by the previous administration. This includes channeling a huge amount of funds towards US military forces and operations in the region as well as the US$500 million military and security aid commitment to the Philippines.
The Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), a budget framework highlighting how the Department of Defense (DOD) is using appropriated funds to enhance and strengthen deterrence against China, underscores the Indo-Pacific’s priority status for the US. For fiscal year 2025, the PDI received US$9.9 billion, the biggest allocation for US military overseas campaigns. This contrasts with the US$3.9 billion for the European deterrence and countering Russia aggression and the US$300 million for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. Of US$9.9 billion, the Department of Navy was allocated US$1.08 billion to oversee its naval expeditionary exercises, including Balikatan, South Korea’s Freedom Banner, and Thailand’s Cobra Gold.
In 2024, the Philippines was the largest recipient of US foreign aid in Southeast Asia, totaling US$741.2 million. Of this, 73% or US$542.4 million was designated for military-security aid alone, marking the highest allocation in the region and in the past decade.
The bulk of this military funding comes from the US$500-million in supplementary funds allocated in July 2024 under US House Resolution (HR) 8035 or the Indo-Pacific Security Supplemental Appropriations Act. This is aimed at modernizing the AFP and the Philippine Coast Guard to improve defense capabilities. Though partially withheld due to the Trump 2.0 administration’s funding freeze on foreign aid, this military aid was reinstated in late March, as announced by Hegseth during his visit to the Philippines.
Most intensive iteration
Under the Marcos administration, acceleration efforts to deter China are also evident in the expansion of joint military exercises, particularly Balikatan, alongside the deployment of advanced war materiel in the Philippines and military equipment procurement. These are supposedly to enhance interoperability among the US, the Philippines, and allied countries in the region. But this has put the Philippines and its people on the frontlines – effectively turning the country into one big US military base.
This year’s Balikatan, taking place from April 11 to May 9, is described as the “most intensive iteration” of the US-Philippine drills. It is considered the largest and most aggressive military exercise not only because of the thousands of troops and country observers involved but due to the staging of a full battle simulation against China over Taiwan and the South China Sea.
Over 14,000 troops from the US (9,000), Philippines (5,000), Australia (200), and Japan (150) are engaging in Balikatan. This marks Japan’s first full participation. Meanwhile, 20 countries are participating as observers, a huge jump under the Marcos Jr administration from just three in 2022. The broader involvement in these multilateral exercises aims to internationalize US military pressure on China, while mitigating concerns over increased US military presence in the region.
The coordinated simulation covers air, land, sea, cyber and space domains, showcasing new advanced military capabilities. For instance, the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction Missile System (NMESIS), an anti-ship missile system, was deployed, along with unmanned surface vehicles during the ongoing Balikatan. The Medium-Range Capability (MRC) Typhon long-range missile launcher is also expected to be deployed – the second since the deployment in Northern Luzon in April 2024.
Additionally, in early April, shortly after Hegseth’s visit, the US State Department approved a US$5.58 billion military equipment sale to the Philippines. This package includes 20 fighter jets, 24 engines, 22 radars and internal systems, 184 missiles, 156 bombs, and other equipment.
Beyond Balikatan, the US Navy has also intensified its activities with the AFP through the 7th fleet, its largest forward-deployed command in the Indo-Pacific. Since April 2024, eight Multilateral Marine Cooperative Activities (MMCAs) have been held in the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) with three conducted in 2025, to improve interoperability and to challenge China.
Accelerating defense partnership
On top of existing commitments, the US and Philippines have agreed to four key new initiatives during Hegseth’s visit to “re-establish deterrence in the Indo-Pacific” and “accelerate the progress in [the] US-Philippines alliance”. These initiatives span the US’s deployment of additional advanced military capabilities to the Philippines, the conduct of bilateral training between both countries for high-end operations, the prioritization of bilateral defense industrial cooperation, and the launching of a bilateral cyber campaign.
The deployment of more advanced military capabilities during trainings and exercises, includes the recently deployed NMESIS and unmanned surface vessels during Balikatan. The bilateral training for high-end operations involves the US Special Operations Forces and Philippine Marines conducting complex landing scenario training in Batanes. The bilateral cyber campaign is a collaboration between the US and Philippine defense departments to reduce cyber vulnerabilities, focusing on establishing a secure defense network, developing a capable cybersecurity workforce, and enabling advanced operational cooperation.
Meanwhile, the bilateral defense industrial cooperation is aimed at boosting US and Philippine defense industries. Priority areas for near-term collaboration include co-producing unmanned systems and ammunitions; enhancing logistics support; critical minerals refinement; ship maintenance and repair; airspace integration; additive manufacturing like 3D printing; aircraft maintenance and repair; and producing system components and spare parts. Efforts to achieve this entail reducing trade barriers, promoting technological cooperation, and identifying joint opportunities for military co-production, storage, refinement and logistics. But the US and its defense corporations will benefit significantly, given that the Philippines has a negligible and import-dependent defense industry.
More problems
Despite its claims of seeking peace and protecting Philippine sovereignty against China’s self-assertion, the US reveals its true intentions by preparing for wars in pursuit of its interests. It uses the Philippines as a pawn in its geopolitical strategy against China by increasing US militarism and positioning itself for potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific.
The Marcos Jr administration in turn continues to enable the US and collaborate with the Trump administration in exchange for self-serving political and economic favors.
This shows how crucial it is to expose the military initiatives and warmongering ways of the US government, in collusion with the Marcos administration. Amid China aggression in the West Philippine Sea and attacks on Filipino fishermen, the Filipino people must assert the country’s sovereignty by rejecting both the US and China interventions and dictates. The Filipino people can choose and assert non-alignment and genuine sovereignty that serves national interests. ###