There’s a new transport secretary. ‘New’ always brings hope, and hopefully a few fresh ideas to steer us out of the transport crisis we’ve been circling for years. But that might be getting ahead of ourselves.

Old solutions

Vince Dizon is the former chief executive officer (CEO) and president of the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA), appointed by former president Duterte. As BCDA CEO, Dizon headed or took part in planning various real estate development projects, such as the Subic-Clark Alliance Development, Clark International Airport Corporation, Clark Development Corporation, Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation, Bonifacio Estates Services Corporation, Bonifacio Global City Estates Association, and the most ambitious and controversial of them all, the New Clark City.

Vince Dizon is widely known as an avid proponent of infrastructure privatization and of attracting foreign investments through public-private partnerships (PPP). With his new appointment, the current Marcos administration reaffirms its unrelenting inclination toward private sector solutions to address the public transport chaos. Pres. Marcos himself has expressed that the new transport secretary should focus on easing the “commuters’ struggles” by fast-tracking priority infrastructure projects initiated by past administrations, as well as launching those in the pipeline – all infused with private capital.

Businessmen as usual

Sec. Dizon then picks up the difficult pieces of his predecessors’ failed transport plan – a plan doomed from the start by the government’s persistent neoliberal thrust and preferential treatment of commercial interests.

But what can Sec. Dizon do? Like him, his predecessors were also business-minded. Former transport secretary Jaime Bautista, a Marcos appointee, was a businessman and former chief operating officer of Philippine Airlines. Arthur Tugade, a Duterte appointee, was a logistics and consumer products businessman and former CEO of Clark Development Corporation. Towards the end of Tugade’s term, his holdings company, Solart, reportedly had assets worth US$1.5 million which were not declared in his statement of assets, liabilities and net worth. It was a messy ending reflective of the equally messy transport sector that he left behind.

Sec. Dizon’s first order of business was to request the courtesy resignations of undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and directors of the Department of Transportation (DOTr) to ensure that the officers of the department he will lead are on the same page. His new appointees have either served during Duterte’s time or are former heads of various private businesses, notably transport, information technology, power, and even electronic gaming machines.

Since then, Sec. Dizon has gained media mileage – riding the carousel bus, holding press conferences here and there, intervening in the Panglao incident involving traffic officers, and relieving airport personnel over another tanim bala case. He even met with the transport group PISTON during their picket and publicly promised to reverse decisions on the failed jeepney phaseout plan. But despite his media visibility, the optics of reappointing recycled officials and business figures through the usual revolving-door system has not been favorable.

Fast-tracking privatization

Then, through DOTr Department Order 2025-002, the new secretary created the Flagship Projects Management Office (FPMO) to prioritize and fast-track key infrastructure projects. These include the Metro Manila Subway Project Phase 1, North-South Commuter Railway Project, EDSA Busway Project, EDSA Greenways Project, Cebu Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) Project, and Metro Davao Public Transport Modernization Project (PTMP). The FPMO chairman may also identify other projects as priority. All of these are carryovers from the previous administration. (See Table 1)

These six priority projects already account for 15.4% of the Php9.6 trillion indicative cost of the administration’s 186 Build-Better-More (BBM) infrastructure flagship projects (IFPs). This is primarily because two of them are among the top five IFPs with highest indicative costs. (See Table 2)

Ranked first is the North-South Commuter Railway, which consolidates the previously separate PNR1, PNR2, and PNR South Commuter segments, costing Php873.62 billion. Ranked fourth is Metro Manila Subway Phase 1, with an estimated cost of Php488.48 billion. The other projects in the top five are the New Manila International Airport, Subic-Clark Railway, and North Long Haul Railway.

The North-South Commuter Railway, Metro Manila Subway Phase 1, and Cebu BRT are ongoing, while EDSA Greenways is approved for implementation, EDSA Busway is under project preparation, and Metro Davao PTMP remains in the pre-project preparation phase.

Five of the six priority projects are funded through official development assistance (ODA) – in short, loans that are offered at concessional rates but will still ultimately be shouldered by the public. ODA donors – in this case, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Asian Development Bank, Agence Française de Développement (AFD), and World Bank – also facilitate their preferred contractors and corporations.

The remaining project, the Php31.2-billion EDSA Busway, will be offered under a public-private partnership (PPP) arrangement. This essentially amounts to privatization, where a private corporation will take charge of either financing, design and construction, or procurement, operations and maintenance (O&M), most likely the latter, as profits are more rewarding in O&M. In any case, the national government will guarantee the private investment.

In fact, the O&M contracts for Metro Manila Subway Phase 1 and North-South Commuter Railway – amounting to Php68.4 billion and Php164.1 billion, respectively – are yet to be bid out under PPP once the projects are completed. These are definitely smaller amounts than the ODA-funded construction, but profits will be enormous. We do not yet know how many years the contracts with the chosen private corporations will run.

Round and round we go

This is where the transport plan is fundamentally problematic. Sec. Dizon’s not-so-fresh approach is only reminiscent of the people’s past traumas with privatized transport infrastructure development. The basic problem with the state handing over transportation financing, design, construction, operations and maintenance to the private sector is its inevitable consequence of profiteering. The private corporation will just endeavor to recover its investment and profit off a vital public service through exorbitant user-fees such as fares and other charges. Infrastructure will also be designed around business interests, and not the routes or needs of the riding public. Eventually, based on bitter experiences, the quality of services also declines until the facilities are completely worn down.

Prioritizing mass transport, like rail systems, buses, and dedicated busways, is a much-needed step, especially since the country has long lagged behind its neighbors in this area. But relying heavily on private funding, instead of public investment, undermines any genuine pursuit of inclusive and sustainable economic development.  

Fragmented planning for an already chaotic sector is what the DOTr is continuing. This is evident in FPMO’s priorities. Given how long the projects take – like the Metro Manila Subway, which began in 2019 but isn’t expected to be completed until after 2028 – and with these being the only major initiatives laid out, the government’s car-centricity and preference for individual private transport and foreign investment remain firmly in place. Still, it is uncertain whether the last-mile transport, the jeepney, will survive the fiasco of modernization. Commuters’ struggles are only bound to get worse, and we’re still going round in circles.

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