Filipinos are bracing for more expensive commodities, especially rice, as the country watches with bated breath how severe the oil shock will become amid the intensifying US-Israel war on Iran.
Food prices could surge to staggering levels, as seen during the US proxy war in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, when Philippine food inflation rose from 1.1% in February 2022 to an all-time high of 11.2% by January 2023, and took two more years to taper back to pre-conflict levels. Rice prices experienced an unstoppable ascent in the same period, which the government could only attempt to arrest by continuing with devastating policies.
President Marcos Jr has assured the public that “everything is normal” and that there is sufficient supply of food and fuel. This is not only a presumptive reading of the escalating war situation but also dismissive of the fact that Philippine food, rice in particular, has long been subjected to imperialist battering before this.
Seven years of rice liberalization in the Philippines have severely tested the resilience of the country’s staple, with farmers and consumers alike taking the hardest hit. The ruinous effects of the 2019 Rice Tariffication Law (Republic Act 11203 or RTL) are now undeniable—rice prices have grown more volatile over the years, while farmers face stagnant farmgate prices and a steady decline in local production.
Now, the Marcos Jr government faces a critical juncture: ensuring national food security and protecting farmers amid a looming global food crisis driven by intensifying geopolitical conflicts and US wars. Yet it chooses to cling to rice liberalization—entrusting the country’s staple to the vagaries of the global market in a time of war.
Surging imports, unstable prices
The global rice market is a narrow market. From 2019 to 2026, on an annual average, only 6.6% of global rice production ends up in the global rice trade, which means that most of the rice produced in the world is consumed where it is grown. However, the Philippine government relies on that narrow market instead of developing local rice production.
Through the RTL, the government liberalized rice imports by removing the quantitative restrictions on rice and replacing these with tariffs. In the long run, the government lowered the tariffs further to allow the unbridled entry of rice imports. This surged without respite from 2.2 million metric tons (MMT) in 2018 to 4.8 MMT in 2024. The average yearly importation more than doubled from 1.2 MMT in 2010-2018 before RTL to 3.4 MMT in the RTL years.
Price stability – that was the promise of RTL. Far from that, price volatility has intensified, severely destabilizing the socially sensitive staple. Prices of regular and well-milled rice decreased in the first year of the law but inched upward in 2020 to as high as Php39.83 per kilo for regular rice and Php44.16 for well-milled rice.
Policymakers then thought that the pandemic could have disrupted the expected downward trend of rice prices after RTL’s passage. But the succeeding years saw local rice take a beating from liberalization. The price of local regular milled rice seemingly stabilized at an average of Php38.28 per kilo in 2021 but became more expensive at Php39.63 per kilo by the end of 2022 and jumped to Php48.48 by the end of 2023. Well-milled rice showed the same trend—from Php42.84 per kilo at the start of 2021, to Php43.98 by the end of 2022, and Php53.82 by the end of 2023.
The years 2022 and 2023 will be remembered as the years when retail prices increased even as imports averaged 3.7 MMT, refuting the claim that the government must import to stabilize prices. The price of regular milled rice averaged at Php50.41 per kilo in 2024, while that of well-milled rice averaged at Php55.58 per kilo.
President Marcos made another round of haphazard interventions. He issued Executive Order (EO) 62, lowering rice tariffs from 35% to 15%, driven by the same neoliberal belief that a deluge of imports would bring down domestic prices. Rice imports significantly increased from 3.6 MMT in 2023 to 4.8 MMT in 2024. Then, by the end of the year, he overpublicized the limited distribution of Php40-per-kilo Kadiwa rice.
The Marcos Jr government was forced to impose a rice import ban in August 2025 and a palay floor price in October 2025 through EO 100. But rice imports still reached 3.39 MMT by the end of 2025. Additionally, the palay floor price applies only to government procurement and not to private and commercial traders who overwhelmingly dominate palay trade. In response to farmers’ calls to revert tariffs to 35%, President Marcos issued EO 105 in November 2025, making tariff adjustments “flexible” to allow the government to respond quickly to changes in rice prices.
Regular milled rice went down to an average of Php42.95 per kilo and well-milled to Php49.21 in 2025, while President Marcos went further with the political photo-op of finally distributing his election-promised Php20-per-kilo rice in the Benteng Bigas Meron Na! (BBM) stunt, but in quite limited quantities and areas.
In the first quarter of 2026, prices of regular milled and well-milled rice are once again picking up their steady rise. Obviously, the Marcos administration is not getting the desired effects from its quick fixes. The DA plans to import 3.8 MMT of rice in 2026.
Now, will rice prices be affected by the current oil shock? By virtue of liberalization, the Marcos Jr government cannot argue that rice prices are unaffected by global events. To illustrate, in the National Capital Region (NCR), as of 11 March 2026, rice prices are rising steeply from their levels in December 2025. Regular rice increased from Php38.94 per kilo to as high as Php47, and well-milled rice from Php43.90 to Php55 per kilo. The current geopolitical crisis will also affect rice imports, as exporting countries will definitely prioritize their local consumption and producers.
The price of an important commodity such as rice should not be unstable—this is essential to national development. Rice should be available, in stable supply, affordable, and safe and nutritious. Its price should be steady. Neoliberalists have argued that these features may be achieved as well with import liberalization, but looking at rice price volatility alone has demolished their argument.
It is also clear that in the years when rice retail prices decreased, presumably due to the government’s intervention (2021 and 2025), average palay farmgate price also decreased, from Php17.14 in 2020 to an all-time low of Php16.75 in 2021 and from Php23.46 per kilo in 2024 to Php17.66 in 2025—nearly the same level as in 2019. The Marcos Jr government’s interventions in 2025, including the Php20-per-kilo rice limited distribution, temporarily reduced retail prices but depressed farmgate prices to their lowest levels—from the official Php16.40 per kilo in July 2025 to as low as Php5 per kilo based on ground monitoring in Central Luzon, the country’s rice granary, by the end of 2025. In sum, throughout the years of the RTL, the government could only achieve cheaper rice at the farmers’ expense.
Production decline, state neglect
Why are rice prices volatile? The Philippine government has overly blamed the weather for what is happening to local rice. But a long view points to the government’s own underinvestment, bordering on neglect, as it abides by neoliberal policies of rice trade liberalization, turning over rice importation to private traders, reliance on imported inputs, and cutting government price and production supports. And despite repeatedly pointing to weather conditions to explain the crisis, the Marcos Jr government has not provided climate compensation to farmers. The cumulative results are declining production and farm productivity.
Local palay production in October-December 2025 was at 6.85 million metric tons (MMT)—a 5.2% decline from the 7.23 MMT in the same quarter of the previous year. The fourth quarter 2025 production volume was the lowest recorded for the period since 2012.
Estimated palay production for January to March 2026, based on standing crops as of the first day of the year, is 4.45 MMT. This shows an annual decrease of 5.3% from the actual output of 4.70 MMT in the same period in 2025.
Looking at full-year figures, while noting that the 2025 figure is preliminary, shows that palay production reached 19.67 MMT in 2025, only slightly higher than the 19.09 MMT output in 2024, but a 2% decline from 20.06 MMT in 2023. Area harvested also shrank from 4.82 million hectares in 2024 to 4.75 million hectares in 2025. Yield per hectare remained at the stagnant level of 4.1 metric tons in the last three years.
The Marcos administration may argue that the country endured one of its most severe El Niño episodes in 2023-2024, which triggered widespread droughts and dry spells. This was followed, at the end of 2024, by six intense tropical cyclones that struck the country within 30 days, including Super Typhoon Pepito (international code name: Man-yi), which caused significant damage.
But the long-term picture is palay output has been largely stagnant since 2018. Palay production grew by just 3% from 19.06 MMT in 2018 before RTL to 19.67 MMT in 2025. Counting some years when palay output declined, the average yearly growth has only been 0.49%, even as population and rice consumption geometrically rise.
Rice farmlands barely expanded, remaining at 4.8 million hectares, while yield per hectare increased by only 7.9% in the same period, from 3.8 to 4.1 metric tons per hectare. Rice inventory increased only minimally from 25.2 MMT in 2018 to 27.6 MMT in 2025. But this has been declining annually since 2019 by an average of 0.84 percent.
Again, the Marcos Jr government may argue that the budget for the rice industry increased from an average annual of Php11.4 billion in 2019-2022 to Php28.3 billion in 2023-2026, during years of high rice prices. Yet this increase in absolute terms conceals a steady decline in priority: the National Rice Program’s share in the total new appropriations for agriculture fell from 35.3% in 2023 to 22.2% in 2026. Today, the rice industry receives only 0.44% of the total national budget.
The RTL created the Rice Competitiveness Enhancement Fund (RCEF) to support farmers with an annual appropriation of Php10 billion for six years. Adding insult to injury, this measly amount was meant to boost farmers’ productivity after they had been subjected to unfair competition from cheaper imported rice. Through the RTL amendment (Republic Act 12078), which President Marcos Jr signed at the end of 2024, RCEF was extended from the original 2019-2024 until 2031. The amendment also increased annual funding from Php10 billion to Php30 billion. However, in a further insult, Php15 billion, or half of the Php30 billion RCEF, is effectively discretionary as its release remains subject to presidential approval.
The burden of US imperialist wars
The government then points to high costs of fertilizers and other inputs—an issue that need not have been beyond its control had it regulated and developed the fertilizer industry and planned a transition away from inorganic farming.
The country is 90% reliant on imported fertilizers and agrochemicals, which account for one-third of production costs, making farmers highly vulnerable to global price spikes and exchange-rate fluctuations. Price volatility of raw materials for fertilizers, particularly Urea and Diammonium Phosphate (DAP), can fluctuate by as much as 30% annually due to global market trends and supply chain disruptions.
In 2022-2025, the country experienced major price shocks, including the US proxy wars in Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine, global fertilizer shortages, and rising oil prices—all resulting in more than 100% increase in fertilizer prices. In 2025 alone, the average price of DAP and Urea—two of the most-used fertilizers in the Philippines—rose by 22% and 25%, respectively. The price hikes were due to shifting trade policies—such as EU tariffs on Russian fertilizers, US tariffs on potash, and China’s export restrictions—although the increases have been less severe than the surge following the US proxy war in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Today, the US-Israel war on Iran is impacting fertilizer supply and prices, as about one-third of the global trade in inorganic nutrients passes through the Strait of Hormuz. The US attacked Iran, which controls 10-12% of the global Urea trade. Iran, in response, attacked Qatar, which accounts for 12% of global Urea exports. Qatar shut down the world’s largest LNG export production facility. Regasified LNG is a main raw material for Urea production.
Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have immediately affected 19% of seaborne global trade of LNG. The US-Israel attack was also the key moment for agricultural shipments to be steaming out from the Gulf, putting production around the world in suspension.
Asia accounts for 83% of LNG shipments from the Persian Gulf. The US-Israel war has disrupted shipments, increased fertilizer prices, and worsened access, especially for the poorest countries. The Philippines sources 24% of its Urea imports from Qatar.
It is not the developed regions and emerging markets like India that will pay the price of disrupted LNG trade for their Urea production. It is the weakest in the supply chain—the poor, agrarian, smallholder countries like the Philippines, which have weak fertilizer production capacity and are heavily reliant on imported raw materials and finished fertilizers. The Filipino farmers and consumers should brace for steep increases in rice and food prices and the most intense production crisis in decades. In the end, the Philippines will bear the heavy burden of US imperialist wars.
Dragged into ruin
What does the Marcos Jr administration have to say about this war as it impacts on national food security? Nothing to question and stop it, and not much to cushion the country from the global food crisis that the war may spark. Rather, the Marcos Jr government continues with the RTL, failing to ensure food security, protect the farmers, and develop local rice production.
The Marcos Jr administration amended the failed law only to preserve its neoliberal core—doubling down on import dependence, offering token subsidies to farmers, and even cutting overall budget support for the rice sector. President Marcos recently announced an equally limited response to the oil price shock—the one-time Php3,000 aid for just 26,000 farmers, which is grossly inadequate for rising transport costs, let alone the needs of an estimated 9 million farmers and farm workers. Meanwhile, the government has yet to confront the looming surge in fertilizer prices.
Seven years should be enough to repeal a law that has only ruined a basic economic sector and brought hardship to the majority. It is enough time to conclude that the only way to stabilize rice and food prices is to boost the production of the country’s direct producers—the farmers and fisherfolk—by providing full state support.
Neoliberalism has long defined the government’s policy framework in the rice sector and across the broader economy, intensifying imperialist onslaughts and stripping the government of the power to resist. But it is not as though the government has been powerless in its policy choices. At the crossroads of national food security and imperialist interests, the government has consistently chosen the latter—allowing foreign and big local traders to emerge as the winners while farmers and consumers bear the losses.
The Philippine government’s adherence to rice liberalization, especially with the escalation of the US-Israel war on Iran and the oil shock that this senseless and destructive war has driven, is dragging the Filipino people into unspeakable ruin. This must be stopped. The Filipino farmers are at the forefront of growing resistance and, by the correctness of their calls, are supported by the consumers and the broader public. The Marcos Jr government must be forewarned of this inevitable direction.